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INTRODUCTION
Shawne Alston—a 235-pound, 5′11″ former running back for the West
Virginia Mountaineers—might be one of the biggest names in college sports,
and not for his football talent. 1 Alston, now thirty-one years old, played
football for the Mountaineers from 2009 to 2012 while pursuing a bachelor’s
degree in criminology and investigations at West Virginia University.2 For
Alston, a college athletics scholarship was like a golden ticket.3 But despite
receiving a full scholarship, during his four years in school Alston struggled
to pay for basic necessities and often went to bed hungry.4
Unfortunately, his situation is not uncommon. A 2020 study by the
Hope Center for College, Community, and Justice reported that 24% of

1

Shawne Alston 2012 Football Roster, W. VA. UNIV. ATHLETICS, https://wvusports.com/sports/
football/roster/shawne-alston/6959 [https://perma.cc/YV76-YNML].
2 Id.
3 See Ben Strauss, Ex-Athlete’s Battle for Scholarship Upgrades: ‘I Feel Like I Helped My Brothers,’
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/12/sports/a-football-scholarship-is-afull-ride-but-it-doesnt-mean-a-free-one.html [https://perma.cc/S2C7-37LP] (“Shawne Alston’s family
did not have much money when he was growing up in a rough part of Newport News, Va. . . . Football
was always Alston’s escape.”).
4 Id.
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National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I 5 college
athletes had experienced food insecurity in the past thirty days, and nearly
14% had experienced homelessness in the last year. 6 Although college
athletes are not barred from seeking concurrent employment under current
NCAA eligibility rules,7 employment is a practical impossibility for many.
The average college athlete spends anywhere between thirty and forty-four
hours a week on their sport, balancing workouts, games, and travel
requirements against full class schedules. 8 With little time to spare, most
must rely on scholarships as their primary source of financial aid. Despite
bringing fame, popularity, and revenue to their schools, college athletes
historically have been barred by the NCAA from profiting off their own
athletic success.9
This struck Alston as unfair. “[F]or a lot of us, a full-ride scholarship
wasn’t really a full ride. I’d be on the field and see all the revenue we were
bringing in, and I had teammates who couldn’t pay to go home and visit their

5 The NCAA is a governing body for intercollegiate athletics in the United States that divides
schools and their athletics programs into three divisions by level of competition and availability of
resources, with Division I having the largest student bodies and athletic budgets. See Justin Berkman,
What Are NCAA Divisions? Division 1 vs 2 vs 3, PREPSCHOLAR (Oct. 23, 2021, 11:27 AM),
https://blog.prepscholar.com/what-are-ncaa-divisions-1-vs-2-vs-3 [https://perma.cc/G4PB-4WPR].
6 See SARA GOLDRICK-RAB, BRIANNA RICHARDSON, & CHRISTINE BAKER-SMITH, THE HOPE CTR.
FOR COLL., CMTY., & JUST., HUNGRY TO WIN: A FIRST LOOK AT FOOD AND HOUSING INSECURITY
AMONG STUDENT-ATHLETES 2 (2020), https://hope4college.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/
2019_StudentAthletes_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q97W-P74B]. Rates of homelessness and food
insecurity for college athletes at Division II schools and two-year colleges (where fewer students receive
full scholarships) were even higher than those of Division I college athletes. Id. Additionally, in 2012,
when Alston was a senior in college, “more than 80 percent of football and men’s basketball players in
top conferences, like the Big Ten and Southeastern conferences, lived below the poverty line” and the
average athletic scholarship left 85% of on-campus athletes below the federal poverty line. See Strauss,
supra note 3; RAMOGI HUMA & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, NAT’L COLL. PLAYERS ASS’N, THE PRICE OF
POVERTY IN BIG TIME COLLEGE SPORT 4 (2011).
7
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2021-22 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL,
art. 12.4 (2021) [hereinafter NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL]; NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N,
SUMMARY OF NCAA ELIGIBILITY REGULATIONS – NCAA DIVISION I 10 (June 7, 2021) [hereinafter
NCAA ELIGIBILITY REGULATIONS], https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/compliance/d1/2021-22/202122D1Comp_SummaryofNCAARegulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQ2C-S4D4].
8 Academics, NAT’L COLL. PLAYERS ASS’N (July 31, 2019), https://www.ncpanow.org/legislationpolicies-resources/academics [https://perma.cc/4XH5-THT8].
9 According to NCAA bylaws, college athletes are not eligible to participate in their sport if they
have ever “[t]aken pay, or the promise of pay, for competing in that sport,” or “[u]sed [their] athletic skill
for pay in any form in that sport.” Before the policy changed in 2021, NCAA bylaws stated that college
athletes would lose eligibility if “after collegiate enrollment, [they] accept[ed] any pay for promoting a
commercial product or service or allow[ed] [their] name or picture to be used for promoting a commercial
product or service.” NCAA ELIGIBILITY REGULATIONS, supra note 7, at 2; see also NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL, supra note 7, art. 12.1.2 (enumerating multiple forms of compensation that would destroy a
college athlete’s eligibility).
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families.” 10 In 2014, Alston challenged the status quo. Joined by former
University of California women’s basketball player Justine Hartman, Alston
initiated an antitrust action against the NCAA, targeting the eligibility rules
that limited college-athlete compensation.11 Acting on behalf of a class of
men’s and women’s college football and basketball players, Alston and
Hartman’s antitrust action, NCAA v. Alston, found its way to the U.S.
Supreme Court.12
In June 2021, seven years after Alston and Hartman had commenced
their action and nearly a decade after Alston had last put on a Mountaineers
jersey, the Court struck down the NCAA’s cap on student-athlete educationrelated benefits.13 The ruling was met with many reactions, including a major
response from the NCAA, which loosened some but not all of its collegeathlete compensation restrictions.14 But academic benefits are just one form
of student-athlete compensation; the debate over college-athlete pay is far
from over.
In the past few decades, the growth of the modern college-athletics
industry has spawned controversy over college-athlete compensation. Some
scholars and the NCAA have argued for maintaining the status quo and not
paying athletes.15 But other scholars and a growing number of the general

10

Strauss, supra note 3.
Sarah Eberspacher & Martin D. Edel, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston, NAT’L
L. REV. (June 21, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/national-collegiate-athletic-associationv-alston [https://perma.cc/23QV-QGHB].
12 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
13 Id. at 2162. Education-related benefits are remittances like “computers, science equipment,
musical instruments and other items not currently included in the [cost of attendance] but nonetheless
related to the pursuit of various academic studies,” tutoring costs, and post-eligibility scholarships. In re
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239, 1251 (9th Cir.
2020) (quoting In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F.
Supp. 3d 1058, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2019)).
14 Press Release, NCAA, NCAA Adopts Interim Name, Image and Likeness Policy (June 30, 2021),
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-adopts-interim-name-image-andlikeness-policy [https://perma.cc/TP7E-T3NT]. Though the NCAA now allows athletes to receive
compensation for use of their name, image, and likeness, it still prohibits pay for play. Id.
15 See, e.g., Cody J. McDavis, Comment, The Value of Amateurism, 29 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 275,
339–40) (arguing for maintaining amateurism in college sports to preserve educational values and
maximize access to sports for college students); Chrissy Clark, NCAA Players Already Get Paid. It’s
Called Free Tuition, FEDERALIST (Aug. 8, 2019), https://thefederalist.com/2019/08/08/ncaa-playersalready-get-paid-its-called-free-tuition/ [https://perma.cc/7USN-GBNC]; see also Brief for Amicus
Curiae National Federation of State High School Associations in Support of Petitioner at 12, NCAA v.
Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021) (No. 20-512) (arguing that removing amateurism requirements for college
sports will negatively impact the experiences of high-school athletes).
11
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public want change. 16 Alston’s historic ruling has validated this desire,
spurring discussion of possible adjustments to the entire college-athlete
compensation structure.
In addition to the question of whether college athletes should be paid
remains the issue of how. Among a variety of possibilities, 17 two main
compensation structures have garnered significant attention from advocates
of a college-athlete pay regime and lawmakers: (1) giving college athletes
employee status and paying them salaries through their universities or the
NCAA, and (2) name, image, and likeness (NIL) compensation through
endorsements and brand deals.
As lawmakers contemplate the best avenue for college-athlete
compensation, a major hurdle remains: Title IX compliance. Any proposed
student-athlete compensation model must comply with Title IX of the
Education Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which protects
individuals from sex discrimination in education programs. In the world of
college athletics, Title IX aims to create equal opportunity and treatment for
male and female athletes.18 With different compensation models for college
athletes on the horizon, schools must consider which compensation model
best complies with Title IX’s mandates.
16 See, e.g., C. Peter Goplerud III, Pay for Play for College Athletes: Now, More Than Ever, 38 S.
Tex. L. Rev. 1081, 1105 (1997) (connecting the compensation of college athletes to their overall welfare);
David A. Grenardo, The Continued Exploitation of the College Athlete: Confessions of a Former College
Athlete Turned Law Professor, 95 OR. L. REV. 223, 229 (2016) (comparing the rules for compensating
college coaches with compensation rules for college athletes to show athletes should be compensated);
Abigail Johnson Hess, Majority of College Students Say Student-Athletes Should Be Paid, Survey Finds,
CNBC (Sept. 11, 2019, 12:53 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/11/student-athletes-should-get-paidcollege-students-say.html [https://perma.cc/V7MJ-KMXY]; Alex Silverman, From Name, Image and
Likeness to Pay for Play, Americans Increasingly Support Compensation for College Athletes, MORNING
CONSULT (June 29, 2021, 4:07 PM), https://morningconsult.com/2021/06/29/nil-college-athletescompensation/ [https://perma.cc/M4YQ-83TN] (showing the upward trend in support for college athletes
profiting from use of name, image, and likeness from 2018 to 2021, and showing that public opinion is
shifting in favor of college athletes receiving pay for play).
17 See, e.g., William W. Berry, III, Amending Amateurism: Saving Intercollegiate Athletics Through
Conference–Athlete Revenue Sharing, 68 ALA. L. REV. 551, 573 (2016) (arguing for a revenue-sharing
system in which conferences share revenues with revenue-generating sports); Michael N. Widener,
Compensating Collegiate Athletes in “Store Credit,” 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 431, 435 (2016) (suggesting
athletes should be paid “store credit;” essentially, a cash stipend that can be used for college athletes’ life
expenses like travel, clothing, and insurance).
18 Title IX Frequently Asked Questions, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2014/1/27/title-ixfrequently-asked-questions.aspx [https://perma.cc/G2QP-54FJ]. To comply with Title IX, educational
institutions must meet requirements in three categories: participation, financial assistance, and equal
treatment. Participation and financial-assistance requirements are based on proportionality—meaning that
colleges must provide participation opportunities and financial assistance in proportion to the makeup of
the college’s student body. For example, if a school has 40% female students, then the athletic department
must be made up of approximately 40% female athletes and must provide 40% of financial assistance to
female athletes. See infra Section III.A.
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While many scholars have provided justifications and proposed
solutions for college-athlete compensation, few have addressed the
compatibility of these contemplated pay structures with Title IX—and none
have done so following Alston. 19 Because Alston narrowly ruled on
education-related benefits, it left the questions of alternative forms of
college-athlete compensation and Title IX compliance unanswered. PostAlston scholarship has yet to provide an answer as well. In her Note The
Dawn of a New Era, Amanda Jones suggests various compensation solutions
for student athletes but points out that the question of Title IX compliance
remains.20 This Comment seeks to fill that gap in the literature as the first
piece to address the compatibility of the two most prominent existing
college-athlete compensation models with Title IX legislation in light of
Alston and post-Alston developments.
Part I of this Comment begins by discussing the reasons college
athletes have historically been unpaid. It follows with a discussion of case
law leading to the Alston decision and a discussion of Alston itself. Part II
explores the commercialization of college athletics and its connections to
unpaid college-athlete labor. It also includes a discussion of the two
prominent models of college-athlete compensation: NIL compensation and
student-athlete-employee status. Finally, Part III analyzes these two
prominent models’ compatibility with current Title IX legislation,
concluding that the NIL compensation model is preferable and more
compatible with Title IX than the student-athlete-employee model.
I.

AMATEURISM, BOARD OF REGENTS, AND ALSTON

Before becoming the multibillion-dollar enterprise it is today,
intercollegiate athletics started as a nonmonetized competition in 1852 when
rowing crews from Harvard and Yale met for a race across Lake

19
See, e.g., Alicia Jessop & Joe Sabin, The Sky Is Not Falling: Why Name, Image, and Likeness
Legislation Does Not Violate Title IX and Could Narrow the Publicity Gap Between Men’s Sport and
Women’s Sport Athletes, 31 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 253, 258 (2021) (arguing that NIL compensation
and legislation does not violate Title IX, but not evaluating student-athlete-employee status). In their 2021
article, Professor Ray Yasser and graduate student Carter Fox argue college athletes should be able to
capitalize off their NIL, in part because it could eliminate Title IX concerns in terms of college-athlete
compensation. Yasser and Fox’s article was published pre-Alston and does not consider the Court’s final
decision, or any post-Alston developments like the NCAA’s interim NIL policy or the NLRB’s
memorandum on the employee status of college athletes. Ray Yasser & Carter Fox, Third-Party
Payments: A Reasonable Solution to the Legal Quandary Surrounding Paying College Athletes,
12 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 175, 199 (2021).
20 Amanda L. Jones, Note, The Dawn of a New Era: Antitrust Law vs. the Antiquated NCAA
Compensation Model Perpetuating Racial Injustice, 116 NW. U. L. REV. 1319, 1363 (2022).
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Winnepesaukee. 21 Since then college sports have grown immensely,
transforming in size, scope, and popularity.22
As college athletics spread, so did the need for regulation. The NCAA
was created in 1906 in response to public outcry over the brutal—and
sometimes fatal—nature of college football competitions.23 In the face of this
brutality, the purpose of the NCAA was to “regulate the rules of college sport
and protect young athletes.”24
But over the past century, this regulatory power has grown
significantly. The NCAA now regulates every aspect of the student-athlete
experience, from recruitment to academic performance requirements to
ethical conduct and beyond.25 Most notable is the regulation of eligibility—
the athlete’s ability to compete in their sport. Eligibility relies on academic
compliance and, critically, amateurism, the oft-debated “bedrock principle”
of college athletics.26
The principle of amateurism, once a steadfast barrier to college-athlete
compensation, has become a crumbling defense in the wake of Alston. This
Part charts the development of the concepts of amateurism and the “student
athlete” and the courts’ treatment of these concepts.
A. Amateurism and the “Student Athlete”
An amateur athlete is one who pursues a sport on an unpaid basis.27 In
contrast, those who are paid for their athletic performances are considered

21 See Guy Lewis, The Beginning of Organized Collegiate Sport, 22 AM. Q. 222, 224 (1970),
https://history.msu.edu/hst329/files/2015/05/LewisGuy-TheBeginning.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5XQSD4LQ].
22 History, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/5/4/history.aspx [https://perma.cc/2MC3A6BC]; Maggie Mertens, 50 Years of Title IX: How One Law Changed Women’s Sports Forever, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (May 19, 2022), https://www.si.com/college/2022/05/19/title-ix-50th-anniversarywomens-sports-impact-daily-cover [https://perma.cc/6YK4-UJSL]; Eben Novy-Williams, March
Madness Daily: The NCAA’s Billion-Dollar Cash Cow, SPORTICO (March 26, 2022, 9:00 AM),
https://www.sportico.com/leagues/college-sports/2022/march-madness-daily-the-ncaas-billion-dollarcash-cow-1234668823/ [https://perma.cc/BY9Y-3ARC] (stating that the NCAA made $1.16 billion in
2021).
23 Id. (“During the 1904 season alone, there were 18 deaths and 159 serious injuries on the field.”).
24 Id. The NCAA was also created to prevent the federal government from stepping in by
concentrating the regulatory power within an independent organization. Ed Sherman, NCAA Hopes to
Avoid Government ‘Intrusion,’ CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 4, 1991, 12:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/ct-xpm-1991-08-04-9103250767-story.html [https://perma.cc/DM9W-TY6S].
25 NCAA ELIGIBILITY REGULATIONS, supra note 7.
26 EDDIE COMEAUX, INTRODUCTION TO INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 322 (2015).
27 See Amateurism, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2011),
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=amateurism [https://perma.cc/ZG6R-J798].
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professional athletes.28 In the NCAA, amateur status is not a choice for the
athlete—it is a requirement.29 Although the NCAA has always preserved a
“clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports,”30 over the years it has manipulated the concept of amateurism to fit
its needs.31 While compensating college athletes was originally forbidden,
gradually, the NCAA allowed for certain payments like financial aid, tuition
costs, fees, and room and board. 32 This evolution is epitomized by the
creation of the NCAA’s signature term: the “student-athlete.”33
The power in the name student athlete is two-fold—rhetorical and legal.
Rhetorically, the term is purposefully structured: “student” first, “athlete”
second, reflecting the NCAA’s desire for these athletes to be viewed
primarily as students.34 It is also deliberately ambiguous—as Pulitzer-prize
winning author Taylor Branch puts it:
College players were not students at play (which might understate their athletic
obligations), nor were they just athletes in college (which might imply they
were professionals). That they were high-performance athletes meant they
could be forgiven for not meeting the academic standards of their peers; that

28 See id.; Professional, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed.
2011), https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=professional [https://perma.cc/9PZA-EQR7];
see also Jones, supra note 20 (noting that the NCAA does not allow its athletes to receive financial
benefits or valuable prizes).
29 See John Niemeyer, The End of an Era: The Mounting Challenges to the NCAA’s Model of
Amateurism, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 883, 887 (2015); see also NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 7, art.
2.9 (“Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be
motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.”).
30 See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 7, art. 1.3.1; see Chaz J. Gross, Note, Modifying
Amateurism: A Performance-Based Solution to Compensating Student-Athletes for Licensing
Their Names, Images, and Likenesses, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 259, 264 (2017) (“Since its
inception, the NCAA has prohibited students from receiving compensation for their participation in
collegiate athletics.”).
31 Kristin R. Muenzen, Weakening It’s [sic] Own Defense? The NCAA’s Version of Amateurism,
13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257, 259–61 (2003) (comparing the notion of amateurism in 1906 at the
NCAA’s inception to other definitions adopted by the NCAA throughout the twentieth century).
32 Id.
33 The NCAA first adopted the term “student-athlete” following a workmen’s compensation suit filed
by the widow of a football player who died from a head injury received while playing for the Fort Lewis
A&M Aggies. See Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/.
34 Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/frequentlyasked-questions-about-ncaa (“The association’s belief in student-athletes as students first is a
foundational principle.”); see also Molly Harry, Abolish the Term “Student-Athlete,” DIVERSE (July 29,
2020), https://www.diverseeducation.com/sports/article/15107434/abolish-the-term-student-athlete (“If
we can work to rid higher education of racist athletics building names, mascots, and logos, we can abolish
this demeaning and degrading term designed to subdue this unique student population.”).
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they were students meant that they did not have to be compensated, ever, for
anything more than the cost of their studies.35

In the years since its creation, the term student athlete has been used in
conjunction with the notion of amateurism to shield the NCAA from legal
challenges. 36 This shield has been effective; courts generally have not
extended college athletes “the rights and protections of labor and
employment laws,” because “case law differentiates between amateur and
commercial enterprises.”37 Even given the monopolistic hold the NCAA has
over college sports, the concepts of the student athlete and amateurism have
long been the crux of the NCAA’s insulation from antitrust challenges.38
B. NCAA v. Board of Regents
Despite criticism, the NCAA has escaped judicial scrutiny for its
amateurism policy. Through the early and mid-twentieth century, courts
tended to be dismissive of challenges to the NCAA’s rules on amateurism.39
But in 1984, the NCAA’s power was tested in the Supreme Court case NCAA
v. Board of Regents.40
Board of Regents involved a challenge to the NCAA’s television plan
limiting the number of college football games that could be televised in a
year. 41 The Court simultaneously ruled that the television plan violated
antitrust laws and acknowledged the “revered tradition of amateurism in

35 Branch, supra note 33; see also Liz Clarke, The NCAA Coined the Term “Student-Athlete” in the
1950s. Its Time Might Be Up., WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
sports/2021/10/27/ncaa-student-athlete-1950s/ (describing the use of term as a “no man’s land between
student and employee” detached from reality).
36 See, e.g., Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor’s New Clothes:
Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 497 (2008) (discussing areas of law
in which “the myth of amateurism” shields athletic programs and the NCAA from regulation); Branch,
supra note 33 (addressing the NCAA’s use of the term student athlete as a legal defense).
37 Id. at 499. In 2015, the National Labor Relations Board dismissed a petition from Northwestern
University football players seeking to unionize as university employees on grounds of inadequate
jurisdiction, essentially punting the issue of whether student athletes are employees. See Ben Strauss,
N.L.R.B. Rejects Northwestern Football Players’ Union Bid, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/sports/ncaafootball/nlrb-says-northwestern-football-playerscannot-unionize.html [https://perma.cc/C6UP-XRAT].
38 Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The
College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 74–75 (2006).
39 See Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust
Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 337 (2007) (stating that federal judges did not want to interfere with the
perceived legitimacy of amateurism and fair competition in NCAA athletics, instead focusing on the
NCAA’s alleged noncommercial objectives).
40 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
41 Id. at 85.
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college sports.”42 The Court also expressed that “preserv[ing] the character
and quality of the ‘product’” required that college athletes not be paid, and
went on to describe the importance of the role of the NCAA in upholding
this “tradition.”43
But because the Court’s legal question in Board of Regents was about
the antitrust implications of the NCAA’s television plan, lower courts
struggled with whether the Court’s language on the NCAA’s amateurism
policy was binding precedent or mere dicta.44 A circuit split emerged. On one
side, the courts in the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits gave varying
degrees of antitrust immunity to the NCAA’s amateurism policy. On the
other, courts in the Ninth Circuit considered the language on amateurism in
Board of Regents with caution, typically finding it nonbinding.45
C. NCAA v. Alston
In June 2021, the Supreme Court reached a critical decision in the
argument for student-athlete compensation in NCAA v. Alston. Arising from
the Ninth Circuit, the case followed on the heels of other important
challenges brought against the NCAA by college athletes across the
country.46 Shawne Alston and his co-plaintiffs, tired of the oppressive NCAA
compensation restrictions, argued that the NCAA violated federal antitrust
law by limiting payment in exchange for athletic services.47 In a unanimous
opinion written by Justice Gorsuch, the Supreme Court rejected the NCAA’s
reliance on the Board of Regents language on amateurism, deeming it

42

Id. at 120.
Id. at 102.
44 Lazaroff, supra note 39, at 339; Leading Case, supra note 40, at 472. Compare Berger v. NCAA,
843 F.3d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 2016) (using Board of Regents language on amateurism to support a decision
that college athletes at the University of Pennsylvania were not entitled to minimum wage compensation),
with O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the Board of Regents
discussion of amateurism and compensation restrictions was mere dicta).
45 Id. at 39; Sam C. Ehrlich, A Three-Tiered Circuit Split: Why the Supreme Court Was Right to Hear
NCAA v. Alston, 32 J. LEG. ASPECTS SPORTS 1, 3, 59 (2022) (analyzing the split interpretations of Board
of Regents and arguing that three main tiers of interpretation in circuit courts have resulted in varying
degrees of antitrust scrutiny across circuits).
46 See, e.g., O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1049 (challenging the validity of the NCAA’s NIL compensation
structure); Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 2012) (challenging NCAA rules that cap the
number of scholarships given per team and prohibit multi-year scholarships).
47 NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2151 (2021). Although the plaintiffs in Alston initially argued
in district court against all compensation restrictions, the district court narrowed its focus only to
limitations on education-related in-kind (i.e., noncash) benefits, and the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court
followed suit. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F.
Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
43
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insufficient as the basis for avoiding antitrust scrutiny. 48 Finding that the
NCAA did not maintain a consistent definition of amateurism, the Court
determined that it was not allowed to engage in price-fixing schemes in
determining compensation and benefits for its athletes.49 As such, the Court
held that the NCAA violated antitrust laws by limiting the amount of
education-related benefits student athletes can receive.50
The Court’s ruling resolved the circuit split that Board of Regents
engendered by adopting the Ninth Circuit’s earlier interpretations and
confirming that the Court’s commentary on the “revered tradition of
amateurism” was nonbinding on the issue of student-athlete compensation
restrictions.51 Despite the importance of the Alston decision, however, the
Court left untouched the contentious issue of athlete pay, narrowly focusing
instead on noncash benefits related to education, like paid internships,
school supplies, and scholarships for graduate school. 52 In doing so,
the Court acknowledged that “[s]ome will think the district court did not go
far enough” in limiting the focus of the case to restrictions on educationrelated benefits.53
Justice Kavanaugh agreed that the holding was limited. In his
concurrence, he questioned the legality of the remaining restrictions on
compensation for college athletes and pointed out a variety of unresolved
questions. 54 Critically, he questioned how any resulting compensation
regime might comply with Title IX.
While restricted to education-related benefits, Alston has broad
implications for other forms of compensation. Alston overruled nearly forty
years of precedent, altering the way courts consider the legality of the

48 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2157–58 (“Whether an antitrust violation exists necessarily depends on a
careful analysis of market realities. If those market realities change, so may the legal analysis. When it
comes to college sports, there can be little doubt that the market realities have changed significantly since
1984.” (citations omitted)).
49 Id. at 2166.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 2157–58.
52 Ishan K. Bhabha & Katherine Hamilton, NCAA v. Alston: The Dawn of a New Era for US
College Sports?, JENNER & BLOCK (June 23, 2021), https://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/
21049/original/NCAA_v._Alston_The_Dawn_of_a_New_Era_for_US_College.pdf?1624463108
[https://perma.cc/94BY-7XXM].
53 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2166.
54 Id. at 2168 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“How would paying greater compensation to student
athletes affect non-revenue-raising sports? Could student athletes in some sports but not others receive
compensation? How would any compensation regime comply with Title IX? If paying student athletes
requires something like a salary cap in some sports in order to preserve competitive balance, how would
that cap be administered? And given that there are now about 180,000 Division I student athletes, what
is a financially sustainable way of fairly compensating some or all of those student athletes?”).
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NCAA’s eligibility restrictions. 55 As Justice Kavanaugh forewarned, the
limited scope of Alston has only intensified the battle for college-athlete pay
by casting doubt on the NCAA’s preservation of the student-athlete and
leaving questions open on the legality of the body’s remaining compensation
rules. 56 Yet the NCAA stands firm in its argument for maintaining
amateurism, as it has for decades.57 The Court has left the goal untended—
reform of college-athlete pay is near.
II. THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS
AND MODELS FOR COMPENSATION
Some background on the commercialization of college athletics is
critical to understanding arguments for college-athlete pay reform. Despite
the excuse of amateurism the NCAA uses to justify not paying college
athletes, in reality, college athletics is a highly commercialized venture. In
2019 alone, the NCAA generated $1.12 billion in revenue, with $867.5
million derived from television and marketing rights.58 Most of the revenue
comes from football and basketball, predominantly from Men’s March
Madness, the annual college basketball championship tournament.59 March
Madness is the NCAA’s largest source of income, producing an estimated
82% of the organization’s earnings.60 The NCAA reports that around 60% of
all revenue each year goes directly to Division I conferences and member
institutions,61 with the remainder distributed across Division II and Division

55 See Matthew J. Mitten, NCAA Student-Athlete Eligibility Rules: From Post-Board of Regents Per
Se Legality to Post-Alston Rule of Reason Legal Uncertainty, 13 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 2 (2021)
(arguing that Alston has broad implications and the potential for unintended adverse consequences,
including the invitation of future litigation on the legality of the NCAA’s remaining student-athlete
eligibility rules).
56 Id.
57 See Billy Witz, N.C.A.A. Is Sued for Not Paying Athletes as Employees, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/sports/ncaa-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/FQ58-5MJV]
(discussing various legal challenges to the NCAA’s amateurism model).
58 William Allen, How Much Does the NCAA Make from March Madness? Where
Does the Money Go?, AS (March 17, 2022, 5:46 PM), https://en.as.com/en/2022/03/17/other_sports/
1647510236_306039.html [https://perma.cc/P7Q9-RLDF]. Across all three divisions, athletic
departments generated $10.6 billion in revenue. Jo Craven McGinty, March Madness Is a
Moneymaker. Most Schools Still Operate in Red., WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2021, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/march-madness-is-a-moneymaker-most-schools-still-operate-in-red11615545002 [https://perma.cc/FP37-N74H].
59 McGinty, supra note 58.
60 Allen, supra note 58.
61 Distributions, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances/distributions
[https://perma.cc/8MX8-XG6F].
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III, and applied towards general administrative expenses.62 Yet under NCAA
rules, little revenue goes directly to student athletes, who cannot be
compensated beyond scholarships, certain cost-of-attendance payments, 63
and—following Alston—education-related benefits.64
Meanwhile, the NCAA has no issue with distributing revenues directly
to its own employees. In 2019, NCAA president Mark Emmert took home a
salary of $2.9 million.65 Other top NCAA officials were compensated in the
millions as well. 66 NCAA employees are not the only ones benefiting—
college athletics is lucrative for coaches too. Unconstrained by the
amateurism requirements that bind their players, football coaches and men’s
basketball coaches can be extraordinarily well-compensated.67 For example,
University of Alabama’s Nick Saban made $9.75 million for leading the
school’s football team in 2021.68 Yet the players have been shut out from
making any money beyond their scholarships in accordance with the
principle of amateurism and the NCAA’s own bylaws.69

62

Where Does the Money Go?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/where-does-money-go
[https://perma.cc/5D94-QF2Q].
63 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 7, art. 15.01.6.
64 NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2166 (2021). It is important to note how strict these
compensation restrictions are. One former athlete describes his experience: “[A]s an alumnus, I could not
buy a Rice college basketball player who interned at my law firm a five-dollar Subway sandwich while
she was at work because doing so would violate NCAA rules.” Grenardo, supra note 16, at 229.
65 Steve Berkowitz, NCAA President Mark Emmert Credited with $2.9 Million in Total Pay for 2019
Calendar Year, USA TODAY (July 19, 2021, 8:04 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
college/2021/07/19/ncaa-mark-emmert-total-pay-2019/8015855002/ [https://perma.cc/2J86-FZP5]. This
compensation did not go without criticism. Id. (quoting Sen. Marsha Blackburn, R-Tenn., criticizing the
president: “Mark Emmert grew his wealth while he cut corners for his employees and cheated his players
out of name, image, and likeness”).
66 Id. (showing that then-chief operating officer, Donald Remy, received $1.7 million and executive
vice president, Stan Wilcox, received nearly $1.4 million).
67 See, e.g., Samuel Stebbins, College Coaches Dominate List of Highest-Paid Public Employees
with Seven-Digit Salaries, USA TODAY (Sept. 23, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/2020/09/23/these-are-the-highest-paid-public-employees-in-every-state/114091534/
[https://perma.cc/VQK3-FMZP] (noting that in about two-thirds of states, the highest paid public
employees were college-sports coaches); see also Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1025, 1028–29 (10th Cir.
1998) (prohibiting the NCAA from restricting coaches’ earnings as a matter of antitrust law).
68 Michael Casagrande, Nick Saban Again Nation’s Highest Paid College Football Coach, AL.COM
(Oct. 14, 2021, 2:21 PM), https://www.al.com/alabamafootball/2021/10/nick-saban-again-nationshighest-paid-college-football-coach.html [https://perma.cc/XPG6-DFUC]. College sports coaches also
have no restrictions on what they may make from their name, image, and likeness. See, e.g., Reggie Wade,
Legendary Coach Nick Saban Teams with the Aflac Duck for New Ad Campaign, AOL, (Aug. 21, 2019,
12:00 AM), https://www.aol.com/news/legendary-coach-nick-saban-teams-with-the-aflac-duck-fornew-ad-campaign-040028054.html [https://perma.cc/DY5P-AFAJ].
69 Prior to the amendment of the amateurism bylaw in 2021, student athletes were required to
relinquish the right to benefit from their NIL and turn over commercial control to the NCAA to maintain
eligibility. See Jessop & Sabin, supra note 19, at 253–54.
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These regulations have been the subject of much scrutiny for years.70
Many scholars criticize the NCAA and universities for exploiting
underprivileged athletes with little bargaining power. 71 As one former
college athlete turned law professor points out, “[c]ollege athletes produce
the excitement and revenue of college athletics by performing, at times,
incredible physical feats under enormous pressure and scrutiny . . . [a]ll the
while . . . risk[ing] serious injury and their long-term health.” 72 These
critiques all seek change to the current structure. This Part discusses the two
main compensation models relevant to college athletes: NIL compensation
and student-athlete-employee status.
A. Name, Image, and Likeness as a Model
for College-Athlete Compensation
Name, image, and likeness (NIL) are the three components comprising
the right of publicity—the right for individuals to profit off their own names
and personas. 73 Like other forms of compensation, the NCAA has
historically prevented athletes from cashing in on their NIL.74 In effect, prior
to Alston, athletes could not receive third-party compensation because of
their status as a college athlete—prohibiting endorsements, brand deals, and

70
See Ralph D. Russo, NCAA’s Emmert: It Is Time to Decentralize College Sports, AP (July 15,
2021), https://apnews.com/article/sports-business-college-sports-63d1739ab77795561b705a8fec31dcae
[https://perma.cc/5T6E-CRVL] (“The NCAA’s rules and regulations have long been criticized and court
challenges have been mounting in recent years.”).
71 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 20, at 1323 (“[The] controversy over whether college athletes should
be paid . . . is driven by concerns regarding fair compensation of labor; unjust restrictions on student
athletes’ ability to earn money; and universities, conferences, and organizations taking advantage of
underprivileged student athletes.”); Grenardo, supra note 16, at 245 (“[S]imply paying for all of the
athlete’s college expenses fails to compensate players fairly at major college programs who generate
billions of dollars of revenue.”); Joshua B. Opila, Note, Pay the Piper, and Also the Punter: An Analysis
of the College-Athlete Compensation Movement, 30 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 529, 529 (2021) (“While the
school rakes in the cash, the player does not see a dime. All the while, he risks his own body—which is
often the source of his future livelihood—to earn high revenues for the university.”). In particular,
Amanda Jones argues that the decades of compensation restrictions imposed on college athletes are
acutely harmful to Black male student athletes. Jones shows that Black student athletes make up 56% of
Division I basketball players and 49% of Division I football players. She argues that the compensation
restrictions have resulted in a transfer of wealth from revenue-earning athletes to mostly white coaches
and administrators and advocates for student-athlete unionization. Jones, supra note 20, at 1337–38.
72 Grenardo, supra note 16, at 225–26.
73 Jessop & Sabin, supra note 19, at 253.
74 See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 7, art. 12.1.2; Jessop & Sabin, supra note 19, at 253
(“An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate competition in a
particular sport... if he [u]ses athletic skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport.”
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra
note 7, art. 12.1.2)).
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other forms of NIL licensing.75 Yet hypocritically, the NCAA reserved the
right to an athletes’ NIL for use by the NCAA, member schools, and
conferences.76 Players were required to sign over this right in exchange for
eligibility, allowing the NCAA to use their names, pictures, and fame for any
revenue-driving initiative the organization deemed fit. 77 The calls from
athletes opposing the NCAA’s compensation restrictions on NIL have been
numerous—arising in court challenges,78 letters to senators,79 and on social
media.80 And college athletes are not alone. The media, fans, professional
athletes, and legislators have joined college athletes in their crusade against
the NCAA’s policies.81
The State of California was the first to take action in response to the
growing pressure, adopting the Fair Pay to Play Act in 2019, which permits
student athletes to use their NIL to be paid.82 Many states quickly followed
with their own legislation, specifically prohibiting the NCAA and athletic
conferences from making rules preventing players from benefiting from their
NIL. 83 To date, twenty-eight states have passed similar NIL laws, with
several others actively pursuing such legislation.84
75 See Mark Emmert, If College Athletes Could Profit Off Their Marketability, How Much Would
They Be Worth? In Some Cases, Millions, USA TODAY (Oct. 9, 2019, 9:16 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2019/10/09/college-athletes-with-name-image-likenesscontrol-could-make-millions/3909807002/ [https://perma.cc/E2NR-CAAJ].
76 Leslie E. Wong, Comment, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit: Ed O’Bannon Takes On the NCAA
for Infringing on the Former Student-Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1069,
1089 (2010).
77 Id.
78 See, e.g., O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2015).
79 See Ross Dellenger, Group of ACC Athletes Urge Congress to Pass National NIL Law, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.si.com/college/2021/09/23/acc-athletes-letter-congress-nil
[https://perma.cc/U583-9H7M].
80 See Laurel Wamsley, Before March Madness, College Athletes Declare They Are
#NotNCAAProperty, NPR (Mar. 18, 2021, 4:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/18/978829815/
before-march-madness-college-athletes-declare-they-are-notncaaproperty
[https://perma.cc/2P99FL5M] (describing a protest led by college athletes against the NCAA’s NIL compensation restrictions
on Twitter).
81 See Tyrone Thomas, Keith Carroll, Randy K. Jones & Aaron Fenton, A Crescendo of Calls for
Student-Athletes’ Right to Play and Get Paid, BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 16, 2020, 3:01 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/insight-a-crescendo-of-calls-for-student-athletes-right-toplay-and-get-paid [https://perma.cc/46RM-TQ35].
82
Jack Kelly, Newly Passed California Fair Pay to Play Act Will Allow Student Athletes to Receive
Compensation, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2019, 12:36 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2019/10/01/ina-revolutionary-change-newly-passed-california-fair-pay-to-play-act-will-allow-student-athletes-toreceive-compensation/?sh=5d4f96d957d0#5e3641ab57d0 [https://perma.cc/H4RT-WVU8].
83 Jessop & Sabin, supra note 19, at 256.
84 Jarrett Varsik, Madison Hiegel & Jeffrey Parry, Tracker: Name, Image and Likeness Legislation
by State, BUS. COLL. SPORTS (June 17, 2022), https://businessofcollegesports.com/tracker-name-image-
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Following Alston and the resultant legal and political pressure, the
NCAA was forced to reimagine its NIL policies.85 Nine days after the June
2021 ruling, the NCAA adopted an interim NIL policy, suspending its
prohibition on college athletes receiving benefits from their name, image,
and likeness for all sports and athletes.86 However, the policy is “temporary,”
and remains in effect only until federal legislation or new NCAA regulations
are adopted.87 It remains uncertain which will come first; both the House and
the Senate have introduced several bills that have yet to make it off the
floor.88 A House subcommittee held its first hearing on NIL in September
2021, hearing from players, coaches, NCAA president Mark Emmert, and
others urging a solution to the patchwork of state NIL legislation.89 As for
action from the NCAA, the organization is uncharacteristically awaiting
guidance from the federal government before making any decisions of
its own.90

and-likeness-legislation-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/7FDF-WRJ4]. Note, however, that while many states
have passed NIL legislation, not every law is effective immediately; rather, many will take effect within
the next five years. For example, New Jersey’s NIL bill does not go into effect until 2025. Id.
85 See Alan Blinder, College Athletes May Earn Money from Their Fame, N.C.A.A. Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/30/sports/ncaabasketball/ncaa-nil-rules.html
[https://perma.cc/XS8W-GUBE].
86 Press Release, supra note 14.
87 Id.
88 See Rudy Hill & Jonathan D. Wohlwend, College Athletes Now Allowed to Earn
Money from Use of Their Name, Image, and Likeness, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 16, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/college-athletes-now-allowed-to-earn-money-use-their-nameimage-and-likeness [https://perma.cc/Y9AK-D8RG] (noting that members of Congress have expressed
support for a federal bill addressing NIL issues). Introduced in the Senate in 2021, the College Athlete
Economic Freedom Act seeks to “establish name, image, likeness, and athletic reputation rights for
college athletes,” yet to date, no further action has been taken. S. 238, 117th Cong. (2021); see also
Amateur Athletes Protection and Compensation Act, S. 414, 117th Cong. (2021) (proposing to set
“standards relating to compensation for the use of the names, images, and likenesses of amateur
intercollegiate athletes and to provide protections for amateur intercollegiate athletes”).
89 See Emily Caron & Michael McCann, NCAA Returns to Swamped Congress Seeking NIL, Antitrust
Help, SPORTICO (Oct. 1, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://www.sportico.com/leagues/college-sports/2021/ncaastill-waiting-congress-federal-nil-bill-1234642992/ [https://perma.cc/A3N8-5KZX]. Others who testified
at the hearing suggested that federal NIL legislation should be based on the following principles: “treating
college athletes as students first, ensuring equity in the treatment of men and women as employees, and
addressing resource discrepancies among different institutions.” Marie Carrasco, Congress
Weighs In on College Athletes Leveraging Their Brand, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 1, 2021),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/10/01/congress-holds-hearing-creating-federal-nil-law
[https://perma.cc/W7V3-NYDW]
90 Caron & McCann, supra note 89.
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B. The Student Athlete Employee as a Model
for College-Athlete Compensation
A second possible compensation structure is one in which athletes are
paid by their universities or the NCAA, becoming “student athlete
employees.” Historically, college athletes have not been recognized as
employees in the public or private sector, and the NCAA has long argued
that its athletes are not employees. However, the argument for making
college athletes employees of their institutions is gaining momentum. 91
Proponents point to the number of hours athletes dedicate to their sports,
the fallacy of the label “student athlete,” and the enormous revenues
athletes generate for their schools and the NCAA as justification for
employee status.92
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the regulatory body that
governs labor relations in the private sector, agrees. In a nonbinding
memorandum published in September 2021, the NLRB argued that student
athletes at private universities are employees under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) and set forth a path for athlete unionization.93 This
position displaces the NLRB’s 2015 stance, in which it refused to determine
whether Northwestern University football players attempting to unionize
were “employees” under the NLRA.94 The September 2021 memorandum
also goes so far as to conclude that some “Players at Academic Institutions”
are currently misclassified by the NCAA as student athletes and instead
91

See William O. Kessler, He Shouldn’t Have to Eat Ramen: A Modest Pay-for-Play Proposal for
NCAA Student-Athletes Participating in Traditionally Profitable Sports, 3 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 56,
57 (2006) (arguing that student athletes should be classified as employees of their school if they play
football or men’s basketball). In 2019, a football player alleged that the NCAA and the PAC-12 were his
employers because they “prescribe[ed] the terms and conditions under which student-athletes perform
services.” Dawson v. NCAA, 932 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2019).
92 See Jamie Nicole Johnson, Note, Removing the Cloak of Amateurism: Employing College Athletes
and Creating Optional Education, 2015 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 959, 987–91 (2015) (arguing that the
“student” label is a guise and the focus for student athletes is instead on athletic performance,
evidenced by the time commitment); see also Marc Edelman, 21 Reasons Why StudentAthletes Are Employees and Should Be Allowed to Unionize, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2014,
10:11 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/01/30/21-reasons-why-student-athletesare-employees-and-should-be-allowed-to-unionize/?sh=480979768d05 [https://perma.cc/H4GL-YL8B]
(arguing that the time commitment of student-athletes to their sports and the revenue generated by the
NCAA, among others, are reasons to classify student athletes as employees).
93 Memorandum from Jennifer Abruzzo, Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., to All Reg’l Dirs.,
Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. (Sept. 29, 2021).
94 The NLRB dismissed the petition without touching on the issue of whether student athletes should
be classified as employees. See Strauss, supra note 37. Not only did the NLRB decline to determine the
status of the Northwestern football players, but it also declined to assert jurisdiction over the matter
altogether. See Press Release, Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., Board Unanimously Decides to Decline Jurisdiction
in Northwestern Case (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/boardunanimously-decides-to-decline-jurisdiction-in-northwestern-case [https://perma.cc/NFY9-GPCP].
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should receive protection as employees under the law.95 In the memorandum,
Jennifer Abruzzo, the NLRB’s General Counsel, vowed to “pursue an
independent violation of . . . the Act where an employer misclassifies Players
at Academic Institutions as student-athletes,” finding support for her
decision in Justice Kavanaugh’s Alston concurrence.96
While the memorandum does not change the current employment status
of college athletes, it does invite college athletes to unionize.97 The NCAA
predictably opposed the NLRB’s stance, vehemently denying studentathlete-employee status in a public response. 98 The NLRB memorandum
signals changing times,99 but it leaves a major question unanswered: does
student-athlete-employee status comply with Title IX?100
III. THE NIL MODEL OF COLLEGE-ATHLETE COMPENSATION
IS COMPATIBLE WITH TITLE IX
In his concurrence in Alston, Justice Kavanaugh raises a question
critical to the compensation debate: how can college-athlete pay comport
with current Title IX legislation? 101 Title IX broadly forbids educational
95

Abruzzo, supra note 93, at 4.
Id. at 5.
97 Following the memorandum’s release, the National College Players Association (NCPA) filed a
charge with the NLRB against the NCAA and member schools alleging unfair labor practices. Yet a
ruling on the issue could take upwards of eighteen months, meaning that for now the NLRB has not ruled
on the issue. See Ross Dellenger, NCPA Takes Next Step Towards College Athletes Being Classified as
Employees, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 8, 2022), https://www.si.com/college/2022/02/08/ncaa-studentathletes-vs-employees-debate-big-step [https://perma.cc/X5FE-KKAV].
98 NCAA Statement on NLRB General Counsel Memo, NCAA (Sept. 29, 2021, 5:35 PM),
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-statement-on-nlrb-general-counselmemo [https://perma.cc/U35Y-BE2L] (stating that the NCAA “firmly believe[s] that college athletes are
students who compete against other students, not employees who compete against other employees”).
99 See, e.g., Dennis Dodd, Classifying College Athletes as Employees, NLRB Memo Sets Stage for
Further NCAA Destabilization, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 29, 2021, 5:52 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/
college-football/news/classifying-college-athletes-as-employees-nlrb-memo-sets-stage-for-further-ncaadestabilization/ [https://perma.cc/S2HF-J6K9] (quoting former U.S. Congressman Tom McMillen as
stating that “[w]ith all this stuff coming down, this very well could be evolution toward compensatory
rights”).
100 The NLRB memorandum leaves a variety of other questions unanswered as well. For example, it
is unclear what this means for public institutions, since the NLRB’s jurisdiction only extends over
private employers, yet the memorandum suggests the possibility of extending jurisdiction over some
public institutions. Additionally, some have questioned the assumptions that underlie the
opinion. See, e.g., Martin D. Edel, Are Student-Athletes Employees or Students? The
NLRB General Counsel Issues Non-Binding Guidance, GOULSTON & STORRS (Oct. 6, 2021),
https://www.goulstonstorrs.com/publications/are-student-athletes-employees-or-students-the-nlrbgeneral-counsel-issues-non-binding-guidance/ [https://perma.cc/N9XA-PTNY] (arguing that the General
Counsel erroneously relied on her own opinion rather than on facts to reach the conclusion the NLRB
should reverse its Northwestern University decision from only five years earlier).
101 NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2168 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
96
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institutions that receive federal funding from discriminating on the basis of
sex.102 When college athletes are compensated, complications under Title IX
may arise. Of the two compensation models contemplated for college-athlete
pay, the NIL compensation model is preferable and more consistent with
Title IX than the student-athlete-employee model. This Part introduces Title
IX as it relates to college athletics. It then analyzes the compatibility
of the student-athlete-employee model and the NIL model with
Title IX, concluding that the NIL method is more compatible with the
statute’s requirements.
A. The Relationship Between Title IX and College Athletics
Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments in June of
1972.103 The law, which is an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex by any educational institution
that receives federal funding. 104 Specifically, the law provides that “[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”105 Because the NCAA is a regulatory body for intercollegiate
athletics, not an educational institution, it is not covered by Title IX.106 Only
educational institutions that receive federal funding are bound by that law.
In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (which later
gave rise to the Department of Education) clarified by way of federal
regulation that Title IX applied to college athletics. 107 Even further, the
102

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
Jessop & Sabin, supra note 19, at 259.
104 Janet P. Judge & Cameryn A. Mercurio, Title IX and Its Application to Intercollegiate Athletics,
in COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW MANUAL, ch. 11 (2d ed. 2021). Title IX was drafted by
Congresswoman Patsy Mink, who was motivated to write the bill after being denied admission to medical
school because she was a woman. Joined by other women with similar experiences of discrimination in
education, Mink broke down historical barriers to educational opportunity for millions of women. Prior
to the enactment of Title IX, only 300,000 girls nationwide participated in high school sports. Today,
more than 3.5 million do. See Kate Stringer, No One Would Hire Her. So She Wrote Title IX and Changed
History for Millions of Women. Meet Education Trailblazer Patsy Mink, THE74 (March 1, 2018),
https://www.the74million.org/article/no-one-would-hire-her-so-she-wrote-title-ix-and-changed-historyfor-millions-of-women-meet-education-trailblazer-patsy-mink/ [https://perma.cc/5UPF-89FM].
105 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
106 See NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 468–70 (1999) (finding that Title IX coverage did not extend
to the NCAA notwithstanding that its member institutions benefited from federal financial assistance);
see also Maggie Mertens, The Title IX Loophole that Hurts NCAA Women’s Teams, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2021/04/march-madness-could-spark-titleix-reckoning/618483/ [https://perma.cc/79J2-URJF] (discussing the discrepancies between men’s and
women’s basketball teams at the 2020 championship tournaments hosted by the NCAA).
107 Jessop & Sabin, supra note 19, at 261.
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Department issued a policy interpretation called Title IX and Intercollegiate
Athletics in 1979, demarcating three categories related to college athletics to
which Title IX applies: student interests and abilities, financial assistance,
and athletic benefits and opportunities. 108 Student interests and abilities
relates to the “selection of sports and levels of competition available to
members of both sexes.”109 While this category has important implications
for participation in college athletics,110 it is not as relevant to the analysis of
athlete compensation and Title IX as are the two remaining categories.
1. Financial Assistance
The financial-assistance category has historically regulated the
scholarships that student athletes can receive. Schools “must provide
reasonable opportunities for such awards for members of each sex in
proportion to the number of students of each sex participating in
interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics.”111 This does not require a school
to give the same number of scholarships or distribute the same value of
scholarships to female and male athletes. Instead, the requirement is
proportionality.112 For example,
[I]f men account for 60% of a school’s intercollegiate athletes, the Policy
Interpretation presumes that—absent legitimate nondiscriminatory factors that
may cause a disparity—the men’s athletic program will receive approximately
60% of the entire annual scholarship budget and the women’s athletic program
will receive approximately 40% of those funds.113

108

Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979).
Id.
110 Participation requirements determine the number and selection of male and female athletic teams
an institution offers, typically in proportion to the rates of enrollment of the respective sexes in an
institution’s total student body. To determine whether participation opportunities are equally available to
both sexes, courts typically apply a three-part test to determine a school’s compliance with the “student
interests and abilities” category of Title IX coverage. See Jessop & Sabin, supra note 19, at 261–62
(describing the tripart test); see also Sarah Pruitt, How Title IX Transformed Women’s Sports, HISTORY
(June 11, 2021), https://www.history.com/news/title-nine-womens-sports [https://perma.cc/Q8PLRC9F] (quoting Professor Karen Hartman as asserting that “[p]articipation rates for women have
exploded every single year since Title IX was passed in 1972”).
111 34 C.F.R. § 106.37 (2022).
112 Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,414 (“Pursuant to the regulation, the
governing principle in this area is that all such assistance should be available on a substantially
proportional basis to the number of male and female participants in the institution’s athletic program.”);
see also Title IX Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 20 (“[F]emale and male student-athletes receive
athletics scholarship dollars proportional to their participation.”).
113 Letter from Mary Frances O’Shea, Nat’l Coordinator for Title IX Athletics, U.S. Dept. of Educ.,
to Nancy S. Footer, Gen. Counsel, Bowling Green State Univ. (July 23, 1998), https://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/bowlgrn.html [https://perma.cc/7H68-GRXZ].
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The Department of Education takes into consideration “nondiscriminatory”
factors that might result in discrepancies in scholarship amounts for men
and women. 114 For example, a discrepancy resulting from higher tuition
costs for out-of-state students at a public institution might be a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for unequal scholarship distribution.
The Department might also consider whether scholarships are distributed
unevenly to “further a sport’s program development.” 115 However, blatant
disproportionality absent a legitimate nondiscriminatory factor is not
allowed.
2. Athletics Benefits and Opportunities
The final category to which Title IX applies—athletic benefits and
opportunities—relates to the various benefits and opportunities
interconnected with college-sport participation. The regulation includes a list
of ten nonexclusive factors that indicate whether equal benefits and
opportunities are met:
(1)

Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.116

But Title IX also takes other factors into consideration, like support services
and recruiting.117 As with financial assistance, expenditures in this category
need not be equal. Instead, the Department of Education requires
equivalency in terms of “availability, quality and kinds of benefits,
opportunities, and treatment afforded members of both sexes.”118 Legitimate
and justifiable nongender reasons may account for discrepancies in benefits
and opportunities. For example, consider the costs of a male football player’s

114
115
116
117
118

Jessop & Sabin, supra note 19, at 263.
Id.
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).
Title IX Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,415 (Dec. 11, 1979).
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protective equipment compared to a female soccer player’s shin guards.119
Although it is perhaps more subjective than financial assistance, the athlete
benefits and opportunities category under Title IX can pose problems in the
context of athlete compensation.
B. The Compatibility of Athlete Compensation Models with Title IX
Part II discussed the two model solutions for college-athlete
compensation that have garnered significant attention from scholars and
lawmakers: student athlete employees and NIL compensation. While both
seek to pay college athletes, the models differ in structure and Title IX
compatibility. The student-athlete-employee model makes college athletes
employees of their universities, while the NIL model does not alter the
working relationship between athletes and their universities. Instead, the NIL
model allows college athletes to utilize their NIL to acquire compensation
from third parties.
1.

The Student-Athlete-Employee Model of Compensation is Less
Compatible with Title IX
Currently, under federal and state law, college athletes are not
considered employees of the NCAA or of their universities. But this may be
changing. As discussed in Section II.B, the NLRB has taken a new stance on
college-athlete classification in a September 2021 memorandum, seeking to
define student athletes as employees.120 In the memorandum, NLRB general
counsel Jennifer Abruzzo argues that some student athletes at private
institutions should be deemed employees of their universities and colleges.121
Abruzzo suggests a theory of joint-employer status by which the NCAA and
a student’s school will jointly employ student athletes.122
Abruzzo focuses her analysis on football players and other “similarly
situated” players,123 resulting in some ambiguities as to which athletes would
be employees. Whether this definition includes female and male athletes of
less financially successful (“minor”) sports also remains unclear.
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Title IX Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18.
The same classification may soon be available to college athletes at public universities. See
College Athlete Right to Organize Act, S. 1929, 117th Cong. (2021) (proposing amendment of the NLRA
to include in the definition of “employee” any college athlete who receives any form of direct
compensation from their school, if the compensation requires participation in an intercollegiate sport).
121 See Abruzzo, supra note 93, at 1, 3.
122 See id. at 9 n.34 (noting that “because Players at Academic Institutions perform services for, and
[are] subject to the control of, the NCAA and their athletic conference, in addition to their college or
university” the general counsel will consider some cases under a joint-employer theory of liability).
123 Id. at 2.
120
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Furthermore, the NLRB only asserts jurisdiction over private universities.124
As a result, any action it pursues in accordance with this memo will primarily
impact private universities rather than public universities, which are
governed by state employment regulations.125
Yet Abruzzo does not rule out the possibility of pursuing jointemployer status between the NCAA and athletic conferences.126 Thus, it is
possible that the NLRB could exert jurisdiction over athletic conferences
with members that are public institutions—which adds even further
uncertainty to the question of who may qualify as an employee. While
Congress has taken no official action to amend the NLRA, nor has the NLRB
acted on Abruzzo’s memorandum, the overall trend is clear—movement
away from the term student athlete and towards employee status.
While influential as guidance, the NLRB memorandum is nonbinding.
However, allowing college athletes to be employees of their universities
introduces allocation and funding challenges. If student athletes become
employees and are paid by their colleges, the institutions must comply with
Title IX, which requires equality in financial assistance. And because Title
IX defines athletic-based financial aid broadly, 127 student-athlete salaries
would likely be classified comparably to student-athlete scholarships.
As employers, schools would be required to determine and allocate an
“equilibrium” salary for their athletes that complied with the financial
assistance proportionality requirement of Title IX. 128 If female athletes
accounted for 50% of the student-athlete population, they would get 50% of
the student-athlete salaries, even though it is major men’s sports—in
particular, men’s basketball and football—that tend to earn the majority of
revenue for their schools’ athletics programs. 129 Under a student-athlete-
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Jurisdictional Standards, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/the-law/
jurisdictional-standards [https://perma.cc/5TYL-3A8A] (“[T]he Board’s jurisdiction is very broad and
covers the great majority of non-government employers . . . .”).
125 Id.
126 Abruzzo, supra note 93, at 9 n.34 (“[I]t may be appropriate for the Board to assert jurisdiction
over the NCAA and an athletic conference, and to find joint employer status with certain member
institutions, even if some of the member schools are state institutions.”).
127 Judge & Mercurio, supra note 104.
128 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.37.
129 See Finances of Intercollegiate Athletics Database, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/research/finances-intercollegiate-athletics-database [https://perma.cc/8MRP-PJXY] (showing
that of all Division I sports, both male and female, only men’s basketball and football earned a positive
net revenue in 2019). But this is not to say that the popularity gap between women’s and men’s sports
reflects the relative success or popularity of individual male and female programs. See Yasser & Fox,
supra note 19, at 194 (describing the longstanding popularity and success of the University of Connecticut
women’s basketball program in comparison to the men’s basketball program).
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employee model, to comply with Title IX, schools would need to shift money
from these revenue-generating sports to less financially successful teams.
Yet schools would likely feel pressured to reinvest the money generated
by major sports back into those teams via salaries to those players.130 This
perhaps would be fairer to those athletes, who would not be required to
“share” the revenue generated by the success of their teams. However, doing
so would adversely affect other sports131 and be noncompliant with Title IX
because it would not adequately apportion financial assistance between male
and female athletes.
Perhaps this could be remedied by Abruzzo’s joint-employer theory. A
school could provide its athletes with a minimal base salary, if it had the
means to do so, and the NCAA could supplement the rest. Alternatively, the
NCAA could be the sole salary provider. Since the NCAA is not bound by
Title IX, it would not have to apportion financial aid between male and
female athletes as required of individual schools.132 This could allow college
athletes in revenue-generating sports to be compensated, but at the expense
of others; those in women’s sports and non-revenue-generating men’s sports
could go unpaid. Even so, external pressures are growing for the NCAA to
adopt and enforce Title IX on its own—even though it is currently not
required to do so by law.133 Many have lambasted the NCAA for its recent
failures in gender equity;134 if the organization were to take on employer
status, it seems likely that these criticisms would intensify.
Even setting aside distributional issues, the source of a student-athleteemployee salary is not guaranteed. Despite the colossal revenues received by
the NCAA and some universities, most individual schools actually spend
more than they earn. 135 For example, in 2019, only 25 of 351 Division I

130 See Yasser & Fox, supra note 19, at 199 (“[I]f the member schools were required to pay college
athletes directly, Title IX would be directly implicated because member schools would likely offer heftier
financial aid packages to athletes in ‘money’ sports than those offered to athletes in ‘Olympic’ sports.”).
131 Mechelle Voepel, Title IX a Pay-for-Play Roadblock, ESPN (July 15, 2011),
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/6769337/title-ix-seen-substantial-roadblock-pay-playcollege-athletics [https://perma.cc/A9NN-7DKY].
132 See NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 468–70 (1999); Yasser & Fox, supra note 19, at 199.
133 NCPA Calls On NCAA to Abide By and Enforce Title IX Amid March Madness Tournament
Discrimination Against Female Athletes, NCPA (Mar. 20, 2021), https://www.ncpanow.org/news/
releases-advisories/ncpa-calls-on-ncaa-to-abide-by-and-enforce-title-ix-amid-march-madnesstournament-discrimination-against-female-athletes [https://perma.cc/KYT7-ZENH].
134 See, e.g., Ross Dellenger, Lawmakers Slam NCAA for Failing to Address Disparity in Men’s and
Women’s Sports, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 15, 2022), https://www.si.com/college/2022/03/15/ncaatournament-college-sports-gender-equity-congress-title-ix [https://perma.cc/AZ4N-MM7C] (reporting
that three U.S. senators criticized NCAA president Mark Emmert for “inadequate progress” on
gender equality).
135 McGinty, supra note 58.
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athletic departments generated positive revenue.136 This leaves very little, if
anything at all, for schools to provide salaries for their student athletes. For
the minority of schools that earn net-positive revenue, it would necessarily
be shared among revenue-generating and non-revenue-generating athletes to
comply with Title IX, leading to markedly smaller payouts for all athletes.
Furthermore, the introduction of a student-athlete salary could increase the
cost of attendance for nonathletes. One study found that a changed NCAA
compensation policy could result in as much as a 7.4% increase in cost of
attendance.137 It could very well be too costly for colleges to implement a
student-athlete-employee system at all.138
2.

The NIL Model of Compensation Is More Compatible with
Title IX
In comparison to a student-athlete-employee system, an NIL
compensation model more effectively solves the issue of athlete pay and is
more compatible with Title IX. First, this model mitigates the sourcing
compensation issue. Rather than schools or the NCAA providing
compensation to athletes, third parties will step in. And because these third
parties are not educational institutions, they are not bound by Title IX.139
Some argue that under an NIL model, schools get to avoid the responsibility
of compensating athletes. 140 But recall from the last Section that many
schools do not actually profit from their athletic programs, and thus would
not be able to pay their athletes at all. The NIL model alleviates pressure on
athletic departments that operate in the red.
The NIL model provides a way for athletes to break past their
universities’ budgetary constraints, and it has already proven to be profitable.
College athletes across the country have taken advantage of the NCAA’s
interim NIL policy.141 Within a year of implementing the new policy, the NIL
market is on pace to provide athletes with more than $500 million in
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Also note that all 25 were members of the Football Bowl Subdivision. Id.
Willis A. Jones, Can NCAA Policy Effect [sic] Student Costs? Evidence from the 2015 Adoption
of Student-Athlete Cost of Attendance Stipends, 93 J. HIGHER EDUC. 56, 72 (2022).
138 Nathan Boninger, Antitrust and the NCAA: Sexual Equality in Collegiate Athletics as a
Procompetitive Justification for NCAA Compensation Restrictions, 65 UCLA L. REV. 754, 758 (2018);
see Voepel, supra note 131 (arguing that employment for college athletes would “compel[] schools to
pay all athletes, which would bankrupt most of them”).
139 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688; see also Yasser & Fox, supra note 19, at 199 (“[T]hird parties
would not trigger Title IX scrutiny because they are not educational institutions.”).
140 See Jones, supra note 20, at 1351.
141 See Sharon Epperson & Erica Wright, Top College Athletes Strategize How to Turn Their
‘Brand’ into Financial Gains with New Sponsorship Deals, CNBC (Nov. 16, 2021, 12:55 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/16/how-top-college-athletes-monetize-their-brand-with-sponsorshipdeals.html [http://perma.cc/6YXG-5KCA].
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compensation collectively. 142 Further, the allocation concerns that arise
under the profit-sharing requirements of a student-athlete-employee model
are nullified by NIL compensation. Schools that would otherwise be
pressured into directing salaries to revenue-generating sports will not face
this issue in an NIL model. Rather, NIL compensation is performance-based,
allowing athletes to reap the benefits of their own success by making money
from endorsements and sponsorships that rely on their own name, image,
and popularity.143
Because third parties are not bound by Title IX, some may worry that
gender inequity will prevail under an NIL model. However, female athletes
have had much success with the new NIL policies, as a growing list of
athletes cash in on their fame. 144 For example, University of Connecticut
women’s basketball player Paige Bueckers has the potential to earn an
estimated $382,000 per year from NIL deals.145 Other female college athletes
have taken advantage of the new NIL policies as well, like Stanford golfer
Rose Zhang, who became the first-ever student athlete to sign an NIL deal
with Adidas.146 Even athletes who are not as well-known have been able to

142 Third parties willing to pay athletes for their talent are numerous and their pockets are deep. Big
names like Taco Bell and American Eagle have already reached deals with athletes for upwards of six
figures. Some football and basketball stars have even assembled seven-figure NIL endorsement
portfolios. See Ira Boudway & Kim Bhasin, Bloomin’ Onions, Dodge Durangos, and Six-Figure
Paydays: College Athletes Finally Make Some Cash, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 18, 2022, 4:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-03-18/ncaa-nil-deals-help-college-athletes-get-paid
[https://perma.cc/T723-D4J5]; Alex Scarborough, Sources: Alabama Crimson Tide QB Bryce Young Has
Already Signed More than $800K in NIL Deals, ABC NEWS (July 29, 2021, 9:39 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/sources-alabama-crimson-tide-qb-bryce-youngsigned/story?id=79142075 [https://perma.cc/P8VE-QWWX].
143 See Matt Norlander, Kansas Players Set to Cash In Thanks to NIL, Potentially Setting a
Model for Future NCAA Title-Winning Teams, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 14, 2022, 1:15 PM),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/kansas-players-set-to-cash-in-thanks-to-nilpotentially-setting-a-model-for-future-ncaa-title-winning-teams/ [https://perma.cc/CH7U-3P7G].
144 See Sophie Chen, Female Athletes Who Have Cashed In on NIL Deals, JUST WOMEN’S
SPORTS (Oct. 12, 2021) https://justwomenssports.com/female-athletes-who-have-cashed-in-on-nil-deals/
[https://perma.cc/B86T-QYL7] (listing various female college athletes who have taken advantage of the
new NIL policies, like Lexi Sun, volleyball player for the University of Nebraska who signed a
sponsorship deal with REN Athletics, and the Cavinder twins, basketball players for Fresno State who
signed a sponsorship deal with Boost Mobile).
145 See Nick DePaula, UConn’s Paige Bueckers Has Name, Image, Likeness Deal, ESPN (Nov. 10,
2021), https://www.espn.com/womens-college-basketball/story/_/id/32598842/uconn-paige-bueckersname-image-likeness-deal [https://perma.cc/Y7TW-CGRJ].
146 Emma Hruby, Stanford Golf Star Becomes the First Athlete to Sign NIL Deal with Adidas, JUST
WOMEN’S SPORTS (May 31, 2022), https://justwomenssports.com/ncaa-stanford-golf-rose-zhang-adidasathlete/ [https://perma.cc/BD25-KY6V].
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make money from their name and status.147 Thus, athletes from both revenuegenerating and non-revenue-generating sports can earn money off their
individual NIL, 148 unbound by the revenue-sharing structures and budget
constraints of the student-athlete-employee model.
While third-party NIL deals do not implicate Title IX, school or
conference NIL deals might trigger the statute based on the form and
distribution structure. For example, after Alston, the athletic department at
the University of Nebraska launched a program providing NIL guidance,
education, and resources for its athletes to help them maximize their earning
potential.149 This likely falls somewhere under the third prong of Title IX’s
application to athletics—benefits and opportunities—and thus must be
equivalent in kind, quality, and availability for both male and female
athletes.150 Schools with these programs should be careful to provide these
benefits to athletes in such a way that complies with the proportionality
requirements of Title IX.
Although the NIL model is profitable and compatible with Title IX, its
practical implementation is in disarray. Following the NCAA’s
announcement of its interim policy, states began passing their own NIL
laws,151 leading to disparate and disjunctive outcomes across the country. Not
every state has passed NIL legislation, and even for those that have the laws
do not go into effect until a year or more after they are enacted. 152 The
NCAA’s interim policy also directs schools to make their own NIL rules.153
Therefore, college athletes across the country have varying rights to NIL
compensation based on the schools they attend and the states in which they
reside. The patchwork of state legislation, combined with differing school,
conference, and NCAA policies “will likely produce scenarios in which
certain types of businesses can contract with student-athletes in some states

147 Kaufman & Canoles, NIL Market Creates New Opportunity for “Non-Revenue” Sports and
Regional Endorsers, JD SUPRA (June 8, 2022), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/nil-market-createsnew-opportunity-for-4073866/ [https://perma.cc/ZQ6Z-H6DR]. But see Robert O’Connell, For the
College Athletes Who Aren’t Stars, Making Money off Their Image Is a Job, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2021,
5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2021/09/07/nil-money-college-athletes-non-stars/
[https://perma.cc/B5BY-P255] (discussing the difficulties that athletes in non-revenue-generating sports
face in building their personal brand to garner NIL deals).
148 Yasser & Fox, supra note 19, at 200 (noting that third-party payment systems let non-revenuegenerating athletes “capitalize on their NIL the same way ‘money’ sport athletes would”).
149 Nebraska to Launch Industry-Leading NIL Program: #NILbraska, HUSKERS (June 3,
2021, 1:29 PM), https://huskers.com/news/2021/6/3/athletics-nebraska-to-launch-industry-leading-nilprogram-nilbraska.aspx [https://perma.cc/X9EZ-LLZC].
150 See supra Section III.A.2.
151 See Varsik et al., supra note 84.
152 Id.
153 Press Release, supra note 14.
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but not in others,”154 creating persistent equity concerns. The interim policy,
and the asymmetrical NIL compensation model it creates, will remain in
effect until the NCAA adopts new rules or federal legislation is adopted.155
Despite the current lack of uniformity, the NIL compensation model is
still preferable to the student-athlete-employee model because it is compliant
with Title IX and has already proven successful. The model also avoids
friction with allocation concerns, as universities under the NIL model are not
required to decide how to allocate salaries among college athletes. The
budgetary constraints that bind most college athletic departments and hinder
athletes from earning salaries under the student-athlete-employee system
will not prevent athletes from receiving rightful compensation.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in NCAA v. Alston opened the door to a
larger discussion of college-athlete compensation. But as Justice Kavanaugh
notes in his concurrence, the possibility of major changes to the current
college-athlete compensation structure generates many questions about
practical implementation. While the NIL model is imperfect under the
current patchwork legislation across the country, the model may ultimately
pave a way to ensure college athletes are rightly compensated while also
maintaining a fair compensation system among all athletes. Therefore,
Congress should enact legislation to standardize and protect the NIL rights
of college athletes across the country. By providing a uniform set of rules for
college athletes in different conferences, states, and institutions to abide by,
our congresspeople have an opportunity to even the playing field. The ball is
in their court.
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Skyler Hicks, What Brands Can Expect from College Sports’ Ever Evolving NIL Landscape,
NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 20, 2022), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-brands-can-expect-collegesports-ever-evolving-nil-landscape [https://perma.cc/BG84-N65E]; see also Liz Clarke, State-by-State
Rating System Gives College Recruits Road Map to Evaluate NIL Laws, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2021,
12:34
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2021/10/21/name-image-likeness-laws-staterankings/ [https://perma.cc/P8MW-5NB6] (describing the “patchwork of state laws” governing NIL as
“the Wild West” and “uncharted terrain”).
155 Press Release, supra note 14.
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